Rep. Norm Thurston — Voting Record

Utah House District 62 · complete roll-call record from le.utah.gov
← All votes

Bill

Critical Infrastructure Amendments
Number
H.B. 165 (2026GS)
Sponsor
Rep. Brooks, Walt
Final action
Governor Signed 3/17/2026
Outcome
Became law — signed by Gov. Spencer J. Cox

Summary

This bill enacts provisions regarding foreign adversary threats to critical infrastructure.

What it does

  • This bill:
  • defines terms;
  • directs the Utah Cyber Center to develop guidance on foreign adversary threats to critical infrastructure;
  • prohibits use of federally banned equipment in critical infrastructure;
  • authorizes voluntary security assessments for critical infrastructure involving foreign adversary technology;
  • provides for coordination between the Utah Cyber Center and governmental entities on critical infrastructure security;
  • prohibits governmental entities and critical infrastructure providers from contracting for or deploying technology included on a prohibited list maintained by the Utah Cyber Center;
  • requires the Utah Cyber Center to publish and maintain a prohibited list of foreign adversary technologies that pose a risk to critical infrastructure;
  • prohibits entities with access to critical infrastructure from entering into agreements with foreign principals that would allow remote access to or control of critical infrastructure; and
  • authorizes the Utah Cyber Center to approve exceptions to the prohibitions under specified circumstances.

Every vote on this bill

2026-02-02House Comm - Favorable Recommendation
House Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Committee
10-0-1not eligible / no record
2026-02-18Senate Comm - Substitute Recommendation
Senate Transportation, Public Utilities, Energy, and Technology Committee
6-0-2not eligible / no record
2026-02-18Senate Comm - Favorable Recommendation
Senate Transportation, Public Utilities, Energy, and Technology Committee
6-0-2not eligible / no record
2026-03-02House Motion to Adopt Joint Conference Comm Rpt
Conference Committee
0-0-75not eligible / no record
2026-03-02House Conference Committee - Final Passage
Senate President
68-1-6YEA
2026-02-25Senate/ passed 2nd reading
Senate 3rd Reading Calendar
23-0-6not eligible / no record
2026-02-26Senate/ passed 3rd reading
Clerk of the House
20-0-9not eligible / no record
2026-02-27Senate/ refused to recede from Senate amendments
Senate Secretary
0-0-29not eligible / no record
2026-02-27Senate Motion to Adopt Joint Conference Comm Rpt
Conference Committee
0-0-29not eligible / no record
2026-02-27Senate Conference Committee - Final Passage
Conference Committee
24-0-5not eligible / no record
2026-02-10House/ passed 3rd reading
Senate Secretary
60-0-15ABSENT
2026-02-27House/ refuse to concur with Senate amendment
Senate Secretary
0-0-75not eligible / no record

Bill text

enrolled version · official source
6
63A-16-1301
63A-16-1302
63A-16-1303
0
Critical Infrastructure Amendments
2026 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH
Chief Sponsor: Walt Brooks
Senate Sponsor: Keven J. Stratton
LONG TITLE
General Description:
This bill enacts provisions regarding foreign adversary threats to critical infrastructure.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
defines terms;
directs the Utah Cyber Center to develop guidance on foreign adversary threats to critical 
infrastructure;
prohibits use of federally banned equipment in critical infrastructure;
authorizes voluntary security assessments for critical infrastructure involving foreign 
adversary technology;
provides for coordination between the Utah Cyber Center and governmental entities on 
critical infrastructure security;
prohibits governmental entities and critical infrastructure providers from contracting for 
or deploying technology included on a prohibited list maintained by the Utah Cyber 
Center; 
requires the Utah Cyber Center to publish and maintain a prohibited list of foreign 
adversary technologies that pose a risk to critical infrastructure; 
prohibits entities with access to critical infrastructure from entering into agreements with 
foreign principals that would allow remote access to or control of critical infrastructure; 
and 
authorizes the Utah Cyber Center to approve exceptions to the prohibitions under 
specified circumstances.
Money Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None
Utah Code Sections Affected:
ENACTS:
63A-16-1301
, Utah Code Annotated 1953
63A-16-1302
, Utah Code Annotated 1953
63A-16-1303
, Utah Code Annotated 1953
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 
63A-16-1301
 is enacted to read:
13. Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security
63A-16-1301
. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1)
"Critical infrastructure" means systems and assets operated or maintained by a 
governmental entity that are vital to the governmental entity's jurisdiction such that the 
incapacity or destruction of the systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, economic security, or public health, including:
(a)
emergency services communications systems;
(b)
electrical power systems;
(c)
water and wastewater systems;
(d)
transportation management systems;
(e)
data centers and networks; and
(f)
systems that store or process sensitive data or classified information.
(2)
"Cyber Center" means the Utah Cyber Center created in Section 
63A-16-1102
.
(3)
"Foreign adversary" means a country listed in 15 C.F.R. Sec. 791.4 as that regulation 
existed on January 1, 2026.
(4)
"Foreign principal" means:
(a)
the government or an official of the government of a foreign adversary;
(b)
a political party or member of a political party or subdivision of a political party of a 
foreign adversary;
(c)
an entity, including a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other 
combination of persons organized under the laws of or having a principal place of 
business in a foreign adversary, or a subsidiary of the entity;
(d)
an individual who is domiciled in a foreign adversary and is not a citizen or lawful 
permanent resident of the United States; or
(e)
an individual, entity, or collection of individuals or entities described in Subsections 
(4)(a)
 through (d) having a controlling interest in a partnership, association, 
corporation, organization, trust, or other legal entity or subsidiary formed for the 
purpose of owning real property.
(5)
"Governmental entity" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
63G-2-103
.
(6)
"Information and communications technology" means any technology, system, device, 
application, or service used to create, collect, store, process, transmit, receive, display, or 
exchange information by electronic or digital means, including computers, software, 
networks, telecommunications systems, and related infrastructure.
Section 2. Section 
63A-16-1302
 is enacted to read:
63A-16-1302
. Foreign adversary threats to critical infrastructure -- Guidance 
and assessments.
(1)
The Cyber Center shall, within available resources and in coordination with federal 
agencies, develop and maintain guidance for governmental entities on protecting critical 
infrastructure from foreign adversary cybersecurity threats.
(2)
The guidance described in Subsection 
(1)
 shall include:
(a)
best practices for identifying and assessing security risks when foreign adversary 
technology, software, or services are used in connection with critical infrastructure;
(b)
recommended security controls and monitoring procedures for critical infrastructure 
that utilizes foreign adversary technology;
(c)
procedures for limiting foreign adversary access to critical infrastructure systems and 
data;
(d)
methods for assessing and documenting risks associated with foreign adversary 
involvement in critical infrastructure;
(e)
recommendations for transitioning away from foreign adversary technology in 
critical infrastructure when feasible and cost effective;
(f)
identification of categories of critical infrastructure that present heightened security 
concerns if foreign adversary technology is involved; and
(g)
recommendations for a comprehensive manual operations contingency plan for 
critical infrastructure that:
(i)
details non-networked, non-automated, and manually executable procedures; and
(ii)
is sufficient to sustain core operational functions of the critical infrastructure in 
the event of a significant cyber incident that renders automated or networked 
control systems unreliable or inoperable.
(3)
The Cyber Center shall:
(a)
review and update the guidance described in Subsection 
(1)
 at least annually;
(b)
make the guidance readily accessible to governmental entities through the division's 
website; and
(c)
include information on foreign adversary threats to critical infrastructure in briefings 
and materials provided to governmental entities on cybersecurity matters.
(4)
A governmental entity that operates or maintains critical infrastructure may request a 
security assessment from the Cyber Center if the governmental entity:
(a)
is considering procurement of technology, software, or services from a foreign 
adversary for use in critical infrastructure; or
(b)
identifies that critical infrastructure currently utilizes technology, software, or 
services from a foreign adversary.
(5)
The Cyber Center shall prioritize security assessment requests under Subsection 
(4)
based on:
(a)
the sensitivity of the data or systems involved;
(b)
the potential impact of a compromise on security, economic security, or public health;
(c)
available Cyber Center resources; and
(d)
other relevant factors determined by the Cyber Center.
(6)
A security assessment conducted under Subsection 
(4)
 may include:
(a)
an evaluation of potential security vulnerabilities associated with the foreign 
adversary technology, software, or services;
(b)
an assessment of potential risks to critical infrastructure systems and data;
(c)
an analysis of the potential impact of a compromise of the critical infrastructure on 
the governmental entity's operations, public safety, or economic security;
(d)
recommendations for security measures or contract provisions to mitigate identified 
risks; and
(e)
identification of alternative technology, software, or services that may present lower 
security risks.
(7)
In conducting a security assessment under Subsection 
(4)
, the Cyber Center may:
(a)
coordinate with the Department of Public Safety and other relevant governmental 
entities; and
(b)
coordinate with and utilize resources from federal agencies, including the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, as available.
(8)
If the Cyber Center identifies significant security risks associated with foreign adversary 
technology in critical infrastructure, the Cyber Center may:
(a)
notify the chief information officer and the affected governmental entity of the 
identified risks;
(b)
recommend that the governmental entity implement enhanced security monitoring or 
controls;
(c)
recommend that the governmental entity develop a plan to transition to alternative 
technology; or
(d)
recommend that the matter be referred to appropriate state or federal law 
enforcement or security agencies.
(9)
A governmental entity that operates or maintains critical infrastructure shall, when 
reporting a data breach to the Cyber Center under Section 
63A-19-405
, indicate whether 
the data breach involved technology, software, or services from a foreign adversary.
(10)
Except as provided in Subsecti
on 
(12)
,
 a security assessment or recommendation 
provided under this section is advisory only and does not:
(a)
prohibit a governmental entity from entering into a contract or making a procurement 
decision; or
(b)
require a governmental entity to transition away from existing technology, software, 
or services.
(11)
Information obtained by the Cyber Center in conducting a security assessment under 
this section is protected in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act.
(12)
On or after July 1, 2026, a governmental entity or critical infrastructure provider may 
not:
(a)
enter into or renew a contract with a vendor for information and communications 
technology that the Cyber Center has included on the prohibited list described in 
Subsection 
(13)
; or
(b)
otherwise place into service any additional information and communications 
technology that the Cyber Center has included on the prohibited list described in 
Subsection 
(13)
.
(13)
(a)
On or after July 1, 2026, the Cyber Center shall publish and maintain a list of 
prohibited companies and information and communications technologies that the 
Cyber Center has assessed pose a risk of providing a foreign adversary with remote 
access to or control of critical infrastructure.
(b)
The prohibited list shall include, at a minimum, companies and technologies that:
(i)
appear on the Pentagon 1260H list;
(ii)
appear on the Federal Communications Commission Covered List; or
(iii)
are a re-labeled version of, or are produced by a subsidiary of a company 
included 
in
a technology described in Subsection 
(13)(b)(i)
 or 
(ii)
, and for which 
the Cyber Center has identified that a reasonable alternative provider exists.
(14)
Notwithstanding Subsection 
(12)
, a governmental entity or critical infrastructure 
provider may use a technology included on the prohibited list described in Subsection 
(13)
 if no reasonable alternative exists to address the need relevant to state critical 
infrastructure.
Section 3. Section 
63A-16-1303
 is enacted to read:
63A-16-1303
. Foreign adversary prohibition in critical infrastructure.
(1)
A company, governmental entity, or other entity that constructs, repairs, maintains, or 
operates critical infrastructure, or that otherwise has significant access to critical 
infrastructure, may not enter into a contract or other agreement relating to critical 
infrastructure in this state with a foreign principal from a foreign adversary if the 
agreement would allow the foreign principal to directly or remotely access or control 
critical infrastructure in this state.
(2)
Notwithstanding Subsection 
(1)
, a company, governmental entity, or other entity may 
enter into a contract described in Subsection 
(1)
 with a foreign principal from a foreign 
adversary if no reasonable alternative exists to address the need relevant to state critical 
infrastructure.
Section 4. 
Effective Date.
This bill takes effect on 
May 6, 2026
.
3-4-26 8:07 AM